This paper studies a dynamic matching market with two-sided private information bilateral bargaining. The model is a private information replica of Mortensen and Wright (2002) . There are two kinds of frictions: time discounting at the rate r and explicit search costs. A simple necessary and su cient condition on parameters for no market breakdown is obtained. This condition is the same regardless of whether the information is private. In addition, we show that a full-trade equilibrium, the one with the property that every meeting results in trade, exists if and only if r r , and is the unique equilibrium if r r. The thresholds r and r are explicitly derived. We also nd that for small r, private information deters entry. We derive conditions for this entry-deterrent e ect to be welfare-reducing or enhancing.
Introduction
We study a dynamic matching and bargaining market with non-vanishing frictions. Our interest in this setting arises from the fact that, rst, most real-world markets are plagued by frictions. Second, we want to understand the role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining markets. Until very recently, most of the literature has considered full information bargaining: e.g. Mortensen (1982) , Wolinsky (1985, 1990) , Gale (1986) , Gale (1987) . 1 Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007) have recently introduced small.
An important consequence is that, when r is small, trading -conditional on entryis e cient. Thus, asymmetric information does not imply ine cient trading and (again conditional on the entry decision) the trading surplus is maximized. However, the information structure a ects the distribution of the surplus between the traders and thereby it a ects the entry decisions. As we show, introducing asymmetric information reduces entry -an "entry deterrence e ect" -because "marginal entrants" receive a smaller share of the surplus under incomplete information. The marginal entrants are the lowest-value active buyers and the highest-cost active sellers. With full information, traders obtain positive rents when they propose, and zero rents when they accept o ers that are only marginally good to them. With private information, traders obtain smaller rents when they propose, but larger rents when they respond. But the marginal entrants in both models have zero rents when they respond. This means that the marginal entrants get smaller rents under private information. This fact causes fewer traders to enter the market.
We show that entry deterrence may increase or decrease welfare. When r = 0, entry in a model with full information is constrained e cient (i.e. the trading surplus is maximized subject to the constraint of the matching process) if the ratio of bargaining weights = (1 ) satis es the " Hosios (1990) condition". When the Hosios condition does not hold and when r is positive but close to zero, entry decisions with full information are ine cient, and reducing entry might actually improve welfare.
In a matching and bargaining market with search costs, there is a possibility of a market breakdown, i.e. no traders ever choosing to enter. Such an equilibrium with no entry always exists, and is the only equilibrium when search costs are su ciently large. An important question, not addressed in the literature, is exactly under what conditions the market is viable. We obtain a simple necessary and su cient condition for no market breakdown (i.e. existence of equilibrium with positive entry). Surprisingly, this condition turns out to be the same regardless of whether the information is private or full.
This condition is intimately related to the full-trade equilibrium. Recall that in a fulltrade equilibrium, each meeting results in trade. The expected cost of search for buyers is equal to B times the expected time until next meeting, 1=`B ( 0 ) ; where`B ( 0 ) is the arrival rate for a buyer and 0 is the ratio of the mass of buyers to sellers in a full-trade equilibrium. We show that
:
(In the full information model, this is true only if r = 0). Similarly, the expected cost until next meeting for a seller is equal to S =`S ( 0 ). A necessary condition for no market breakdown in a full-trade equilibrium is that the total expected cost of search is less than the maximum gain from trade, which in our model is normalized to 1:
We show that this same condition is both necessary and su cient for existence of some equilibrium with entry, not necessarily full-trade. This is even more surprising given that the equilibrium buyer-to-seller ratio is not necessarily equal to 0 . Note also that this condition doesn't include the discount rate r, nor does it include any features of the type distributions F and G beyond the unit support assumption.
The no-breakdown condition (1) implies that market can break down even if the search costs are small. This will be the case if, for xed B and S , the bargaining power is su ciently asymmetric:
is su ciently close either to 0 or 1. If, for example, is close to 1, 0 becomes small. Since`S( 0 ) ! 0 as 0 ! 0, we see that K ( 0 ) ! 1. For more intuition, rst observe that there is no equilibrium with entry if = 0 or = 1. This is because the marginal participating types can only recover their search costs when they propose. Now when for example is su ciently close to 1, the buyers can only recover their search costs if they meet sellers often, which in our model can only occur if is small. But by the same token, the sellers will then nd it di cult to match, and will not be able to recover their search costs, which leads to a market breakdown. 5 The existence proof for a search model with costly participation is complicated due to two problems. The rst problem is that the strategy pro le of the agents determines the steady state stock of buyer and sellers in a non-trivial manner. In addition, for a given strategy pro le, there might exist a multiplicity of steady state stocks or none at all. Second, the existence of a trivial no-trade equilibrium implies that one cannot simply use xed point theorems to prove existence of an equilibrium with positive trade. The rst problem can be solved by looking at the self-map of continuation values (equivalent to strategies in this setting) and the stock type distributions. 6 The second problem, existence of a trivial equilibrium without trade, can be solved by restricting the domain of the map described before so that the stock distributions of types and the continuation values have to be in some set D " , with " > 0 denoting a minimal entry: All buyers v 1 " and all sellers c " are induced to enter. Then, existence of an equilibrium is shown which by assumption must have some trade. With " small enough it is shown that these traders have a strict incentive to enter voluntarily. Therefore, a non-trivial equilibrium must exist even without the restriction to " > 0. 7 Existence results for non-trivial equilibria for small entry costs have been in the literature for quite a while, Gale (1987) is one example. But we are not aware of a paper that shows existence of a non-trivial equilibrium in a search model with entry in such a general way. In particular, no paper that we know of goes all the way to showing that a nontrivial equilibrium exists "if and only if" search costs are below an explicit bound.
Several papers have compared complete and incomplete information in search markets, e.g. Inderst (2001) , Inderst and M• uller (2002) , Moreno and Wooders (2002) , and Lauermann (2008) . A consistent nding in these papers is that equilibrium outcomes might be independent of the information structure for some parameter constellations. In addition, the last two papers show that more information might be worse for some parameter constellations. However, the reasons for that are unrelated to the entry channel. Moreno and Wooders (2002) consider a bilateral matching and bargaining market with two-sided private information and one-time entry. There is no entry cost in their model. They construct a numerical example in which the surplus is (slightly) higher with private information. In 5 Shneyerov and Wong (2008) derive a similar viability condition for another popular bargaining protocol, the k-double auction. This condition is weaker.
6 For di erent settings, this technique is also used in Lauermann (2008) , and in Atakan (2008) . 7 A related technique was used in Atakan (2008) , called "FDL, Free draw for low cost sellers" which requires that sellers with cost below some small " must enter for at least one period. However, he does not show that the restriction to " > 0 becomes nonbinding. In addition, given the emphasis in Atakan on small frictions, it is unlikely that Atakan's technique can be extended easily to settings with large frictions. Lauermann (2006b) , there is no cost of search, and all potential traders enter. There is no discounting either. The only friction is exogenous exit rate . The sellers have all the bargaining power, = 1, and all have the same cost. As in our model, the buyers are heterogeneous. Lauermann (2006b) considers both private and full information. He shows that, as the friction is removed ( ! 0), with private information all equilibria converge to perfect competition. In particular, the price o ers converge to the sellers' cost.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces our model. Section 3 explores full-trade equilibria. Section 4 states the general existence theorem and outlines its proof. Section 5 explores the entry e ect of private information. Section 6 provides directions for future research. The proofs we do not provide in the text are in the Appendix.
The Model
The agents in our model are potential buyers and sellers of a homogeneous, indivisible good. Each buyer has a unit demand for the good, while each seller has unit supply. All traders are risk neutral. Potential buyers are heterogeneous in their valuations (or types) v of the good. Potential sellers are also heterogeneous in their costs (or types) c of providing the good. For simplicity, we assume v; c 2 [0; 1]. Time is continuous and in nite horizon. The instantaneous discount rate is r 0. The details of the model are as follows:
Entry: Potential buyers and sellers are continuously born at rates b and s respectively. The types of new-born buyers are drawn i.i.d. from the c.d.f. F (v) and the types of new-born sellers are drawn i.i.d. from the c.d.f. G(c). Each trader's type will not change once it is drawn. Entry (or participation, or being active) is voluntary. Each potential trader decides whether to enter the market once they are born. Those who do not enter will get zero payo . Those who enter must incur the search cost continuously at the rate B for buyers and S for sellers, until they leave the market.
Matching: Active buyers and sellers are randomly and continuously matched pairwise with the instantaneous rate of matching given by a matching function M (B; S), where B and S are the masses of active buyers and active sellers currently in the market.
Bargaining: Once a pair of buyer and seller is matched, they bargain without observing the type of their partner. The bargaining protocol is take-it-or-leave-it o er : with probability 2 (0; 1), the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it o er to the buyer, then the buyer chooses either to accept or reject. And with probability 1 the buyer proposes and the seller responds. We also assume the market is anonymous, so that the bargainers do not know their partners' market history, e.g. how long they have been in the market, what they proposed previously, and what o ers they rejected previously.
If a type v buyer and a type c seller trade at a price p, then they leave the market with (current value) payo v p, and p c respectively. If bargaining between the matched pair breaks down, both traders can either stay in the market waiting for another match (and incur the search costs) as if they were never matched, or simply exit and never come back.
We make the following assumptions on the primitives of our model.
Assumption 1 (distributions of in ow types) The cumulative distributions F (v) and G(c) of in ow types have densities f (v) and g(c) on (0; 1), bounded away from 0 and 1:
are nondecreasing.
Assumption 2 (matching function) The matching function M is continuous on R 2 + , nondecreasing in each argument, exhibits constant returns to scale (i.e. homogeneous of degree one), and satis es M (0; S) = M (B; 0) = 0. 8 It turns out to be more convenient to work with a normalized matching function. Let B=S be the steady-state ratio of buyers to sellers, and de ne m( ) M ( ; 1). Since the matching technology is constant returns to scale, m( ) is also equal to M (B; S) =S, the expected probability that a seller is matched over a time period of length 1. Similarly, m ( ) = is equal to M (B; S) =B, the expected probability that a buyer is matched over a time period of length 1. Note that m( ) and m( )= are nondecreasing and nonincreasing respectively in , and m is continuous on R ++ . In this notation, the Poisson arrival rates for buyers and sellers becomè
We now proceed to the de nition of a nontrivial steady-state equilibrium. Let B : [0; 1] ! f0; 1g and S : [0; 1] ! f0; 1g be the buyers' and sellers' entry strategies immediately after birth (or a breakdown of bargaining). For example, B (v) = 1 means type v buyer enters; S (c) = 0 means type c seller does not enter. Let A B [0; 1] and A S [0; 1] be the sets of active buyers' and sellers' types, i.e.
A S fc 2 [0; 1] : S (c) = 1g:
Let p B (v) and p S (c) be the proposing strategies of buyers and sellers respectively. 9 Similarly, letṽ(v) andc(c) be the acceptance levels, characterizing the responding strategies of buyers and sellers respectively. Precisely, a type v buyer would propose the trading price p B (v), and would accept a proposed price p if and only ifṽ(v) p. Analogous meanings apply to p S (c) andc(c). In our steady-state equilibrium, all these strategies are assumed to be time-invariant. Let (v), (c) be the (endogenous) steady-state cumulative distributions of types of buyers and sellers who are active. The equilibria of our model can be de ned as a collection E f B ; S ; p B ; p S ;ṽ;c; B; S; ; g such that:
(i) given the relevant beliefs made from E, every potential and active buyer (resp. seller) nds the entry strategy given by B (resp. S ), the proposing strategy p B ( ) (resp. p S ( )) and the responding strategy characterized byṽ( ) (resp.c( )) to be their sequentially optimal strategies;
(ii) E generates B; S; ; in steady state.
Notice that an uninteresting no-trade equilibrium always exists in which no potential trader enters. In the following, we will study steady-state market equilibria in with positive entry. We call them nontrivial steady-state equilibria.
The mathematical conditions for (nontrivial steady-state) equilibria are as follows. Consider the sequential optimality of the responding strategies rst. Let W B (v) be the equilibrium lifetime utility of a new-born type v buyer. In steady state, it also represents her continuation payo immediately after a bargaining breakdown and before making the decision of re-entering. Hence W B (v) can be regarded as the buyer's entry-stage continuation payo . Similarly, let W S (c) be the lifetime utility and the entry-stage continuation payo of a type c seller. Pick a type v buyer. 10 If she is in a responding stage with an o er p at hand, her continuation payo is maxfv p; W B (v)g. Similar logic applies to sellers' situation. Therefore, sequential optimality of responding strategies requires the acceptance levels to be equal to what we shall call dynamic trader types
(2)
The proposing strategies are characterized in a simple manner using our dynamic type functionsṽ (v) andc (c). To this end, it is useful to consider the distributions of traders' dynamic types, denoted as~
Consider the situation where a type v buyer is in a proposing stage, given that sellers use responding strategy characterized byc (c) and sellers' distribution is . If the buyer propose p (a one-shot deviation) and this o er is accepted, her continuation payo would be v p; and if her o er is rejected, her continuation payo would be W B (v). Therefore, her continuation payo in a proposing stage, contingent on proposing p, is Zc
which can be rewritten as~
Only the rst term, which is the \capital gain part", depends on p. Similar logic applies to sellers' situation. It is clear that sequential optimality of proposing strategies is satis ed if and only if
It follows that the equilibrium proposing strategies are determined as best-responses in the static monopoly problems where the distributions of responders' types are replaced by the distributions of the responders' dynamic types and the proposers' types are replaced by the proposers' dynamic types. As we have seen, this principle applies to the responding strategies as well. In general, the bargainers behave as if they are in a one-shot game with their types replaced by their dynamic types. Intuitively, trading with current partner causes a trader to give up the opportunity of searching and trading with another partner. The dynamic types re ect the traders' opportunity cost of searching. Before turning to the sequential optimality of entry strategies, notice that a type v buyer's expected bargaining surplus from a meeting is equal to
Further denote
the buyer's probability of a successful trade in a given meeting. With probability 1 q B (v), the bargaining is unsuccessful, giving her a continuation payo W B (v). Now suppose a type v buyer chooses to enter. She has to search until the next meeting. Since the buyer's searching time before her next meeting is exponentially distributed with mean 1=`B, 11 the present value of one dollar to be received at the time of next meeting is equal to
Similarly, the accumulated discounted search cost over the period until next meeting is equal to
Then the buyer's entry-stage continuation payo W B (v) must satisfy the following recursive equation:
where the rst maximand represents the payo upon entry, and the second, which is 0, represents the payo if she exits. Solving (12) for W B (v), we obtain an equivalent ratio-form formula:
Therefore, the buyers' sequentially optimal entry strategy is
where I ( ) is the indicator function. Note that (13) implicitly assumes that traders enter if they are indi erent between entering or not. This is only for expositional simplicity because the set of such indi erent traders is of measure 0. Completely parallel logic applies to the sellers' side. We can de ne S , q S , R S and K S similarly:
Then we have the recursive equation for W S :
and the sellers' sequentially optimal entry strategy is
This completes the description of the strategic part of a nontrivial steady-state equilibrium. To complete the description of nontrivial steady-state equilibrium, we turn to the steady state equations for the distributions of active buyer and seller types and and active trader masses B and S. In a steady-state market equilibrium, traders who entered would not exit until they trade successfully. Therefore,
which simply state that the in ow rate for each type of trader must be equal to the corresponding out ow rate. These preparations allow us to formally de ne nontrivial steady-state equilibrium. Our de nition mirrors that in Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007) .
De nition 1
A collection E f B ; S ; p B ; p S ;ṽ;c; B; S; ; g is a nontrivial steady-state equilibrium if there exists a pair of equilibrium payo functions fW B ; W S g such that (i) the proposing strategies p B and p S , responding strategiesṽ andc, entry strategies B and S satisfy the sequential optimality conditions (6), (7), (2), (3), (13) and (18), (ii) the distributions of active buyer and seller types and and active trader masses B and S solve the steady-state equations (19) and (20), (iii) the payo functions W B and W S solve the recursive equations (12) and (17), and (iv) the sets of active buyers' and sellers' types A B and A S have nonempty interiors.
Our characterization of equilibria begins with showing that the slopes of W B (v) and W S (c) are equal to the corresponding "ultimate probabilities of trade", de ned as the present value of one dollar to be received at the time of next successful trade. Since every active trader must recover their search costs, these ultimate probabilities are strictly positive on A B and A S . Therefore A B and A S must be intervals, A B = [v; 1] and A S = [0; c] (recall that we resolve the ties of the marginal types by requiring them to enter). The formal proofs of the following four lemmas are in Appendix.
Lemma 1 In any nontrivial steady-state equilibrium, W B (v) and W S (c) are absolutely continuous and convex. The sets of active trader types are intervals:
The trading probability q B (v) is strictly positive and nondecreasing in v on A B , while q S (c) is strictly positive and nonincreasing in c on A S .
Next, since the derivatives W 0 B (v) 2 [0; 1) and W 0 S (c) 2 ( 1; 0], Lemma 1 implies that the responding strategiesṽ andc (dynamic types) must be monotonic. 
Moreover, if r > 0, then the responding strategies are strictly increasing on A B and A S ; if r = 0, thenṽ( ) andc( ) are constant on A B and A S .
From a standard increasing di erences argument, the proposing strategies p B and p S must be also nondecreasing.
Lemma 3 In any nontrivial steady-state equilibrium, the proposing strategies p B (v) and p S (c) are nondecreasing on A B and A S respectively.
Since the dynamic opportunity costs of trading for marginal entering types of traders are zero (i.e. W B (v) = W S ( c) = 0), we can see that the marginal entering types are equal to the corresponding dynamic types:
From monotonicity ofc andṽ, the sellers' minimum acceptable price and the buyers' maximum acceptable price arec (0) andṽ (1):
From monotonicity of p B and p S , the smallest and largest o ers by buyers and sellers are
The following lemma further describes the patterns of equilibrium strategies.
Lemma 4 In any nontrivial steady-state equilibrium,
The intuition is that, in equilibrium, the marginal entrants do not get any bargaining surplus when they respond (i.e. p S (0) v and p B (1) c) so that they must earn positive surpluses in proposing states, otherwise they cannot recover their search costs. Since even the marginal entrants earn positive proposing surplus, all entrants do as well. Then any buyer's o er must be lower than his dynamic value and within the support of sellers' acceptable prices
In order for the o er p B (v) to be accepted with positive probability, the inequalityc (0) p B (v) must be strict unless c (0) is an atom point in sellers' responding strategy. But the atom point can occur only when r = 0, in which casec (0) = c. Of course, a symmetric argument can be made by switching the roles of buyers and sellers. Figure 1 visualizes the pattern of equilibrium proposing and responding strategies.
Full-trade equilibria
In this section, we study the properties of full-trade equilibria, in which every meeting results in trade. Our analysis start with the following important lemma that gives indi erence conditions for the marginal entrants.
, Figure 1 : Proposing and responding strategies in a non-full-trade equilibrium Lemma 5 In any nontrivial steady-state equilibrium,
In the left-hand sides of equations (25) and (26) we have marginal traders' expected pro t rates from trading, gross of search costs. To see the intuition for equation (25), note that a marginal participating buyer v makes positive pro t only if he meets a seller, proposes, and his o er is accepted (the combined probability is`B (1 ) ~ (p B (v))), and conditional on that, the pro t is equal to the di erence between his valuation and the price he proposes, v p B (v). Similar logic applies to equation (26).
There are two qualitatively di erent possibilities. First, it may be that at least one of the trading probabilities~ (p B (v)) or 1 ~ (p S ( c)) is less than 1. We call such an equilibrium a non-full-trade equilibrium because not every meeting results in a trade. An equilibrium of this kind is shown in Figure 1 .
In contrast, it may happen that the supports of the types in the market are separated, so that the marginal entrants could possibly trade with probability 1, i.e.~ (p B (v)) = 1 ~ (p S ( c)) = 1. We call such equilibria full-trade equilibria. Lemma 4 implies that fulltrade equilibria must have the following properties: (i) the supports for active buyers' types and active sellers' types are separate, i.e. v > c; (ii) the lowest buyer's o er p B (v) is exactly at the o er acceptable to all active sellers, i.e. p B (v) = c; and (iii) the highest seller's o er p S ( c) is exactly at the o er acceptable to all active buyers: p S ( c) = v. It is easy to see that the converse is also true. Thus we could alternatively de ne a full-trade equilibrium to be a nontrivial steady-state equilibrium with p B (v) = c and p S ( c) = v. Figure 2 illustrates the qualitative features of strategies in a full-trade equilibrium. In particular, the proposing strategies must be at and the responding strategies must be linear. Our uniqueness and existence results are closely related to full-trade equilibria. Moreover, full-trade equilibria admit a very simple characterization, which we present now.
Conditions (25) and (26) of Lemma 5 take the form
Noticing that`S( )=`B( ) = , the marginal type equations (27) and (28) can be easily solved for and v c:
where
In steady state, the incoming ow of active buyers must equal the incoming ow of active
Since v c is determined from (30), v and c are uniquely pinned down by (31). A full-trade equilibrium, if exists, is uniquely characterized by equations (27), (28), and (31). We use subscript "0" to denote the objects of this unique full-trade equilibrium candidate, e.g. ( 0 ; v 0 ; c 0 ). 12
12 Other endogenous variables are easily obtained. In particular, for v 2
It is clear from (30) that K ( 0 ) < 1 is a necessary and su cient condition for existence of a solution (v 0 ; c 0 ). 13 The function K ( ), especially the value K ( 0 ), will play an important role in our analysis. It can be interpreted as the expected search costs incurred by a pair of buyer and seller when the buyer-seller ratio is and there is no discounting. In the full-trade equilibrium, this expected search costs, K ( 0 ), is equal to the entry gap v 0 c 0 , as shown in (30). The following lemma, which will be used frequently in the proofs, shows that K ( 0 ) can also be interpreted either as a maximin or the minimax value of adjusted accumulated search costs until the next meeting.
Lemma 6
We have
Proof. Refer to Figure 3 . Note that`B ( ) is a nonincreasing function, while`S ( ) is an nondecreasing function. The maximin and minimax values are realized at the intersection of the curves
Even if K ( 0 ) < 1, so that a solution to equations (29) (31) exists, this solution may not characterize an equilibrium, since buyers may have an incentive to bid lower than c 0 , and similarly sellers may have an incentive to bid above v 0 . Nevertheless, we derive (in the Appendix) the following necessary and su cient conditions under which such deviations are unpro table and hence the solution ( 0 ; v 0 ; c 0 ) characterizes a full-trade equilibrium.
Theorem 1 (Existence of full-trade equilibrium) A (unique) full-trade equilibrium exists if and only if (i) K ( 0 ) < 1 where 0 (1 ) S = B , so that there exists a unique solution to the characterizing equations (29) (31), and (ii) r r where r is given by:
(If both denominators are 0, there is no upper bound so a full-trade equilibrium exists for all r 0. In this case we de ne r = 1.)
Corollary 1 (a) In the region where r < 1, if B and S increase, then r increases, and vice versa. (b) Given r > 0, there is > 0 such that full-trade equilibrium does not exist whenever B ; S < . (c) Given r 0, a full-trade equilibrium exists when 
Then (a) follows.
As
Thus both of them are negative when v 0 and c 0 are su ciently close to 1 and 0 respectively. But v 0 and c 0 can be made arbitrarily close to 1 and 0 respectively by letting K( 0 ) be less than but close enough to 1. Hence r = 1 if K( 0 ) is less than but close to 1. Then (c) follows.
(d) is simply from r > 0 for any B ; S > 0 such that K( 0 ) < 1. Q.E.D.
We also show that a full-trade equilibrium is a unique equilibrium for small r > 0. That is to say, there cannot be a non-full-trade equilibrium when r is small. The proof of this is based on the following lemma. This lemma proves that one important property of the full-trade equilibrium, that K ( 0 ) separates the entry gap v c (if any) and the length of the "acceptance interval"ṽ (1) c (0), carries over to all equilibria.
Lemma 7 In any nontrivial steady-state equilibrium, we havẽ
The rst inequality (33) is strict if r > 0. (0) ; it follows from the entry conditions (25) and (26) 
This proves (33). If r > 0, we haveṽ (1) > v and c >c (0), which make (33) strict. (34) is proved by applying a revealed-preference argument to the same entry conditions (25) and (26). Consider the deviations in which the v-buyers propose c and c-sellers propose v, we have:
and`Sq S ( c) S , and these inequalities continue to hold for all participating types because q B (resp. q S ) is nondecreasing (resp. nonincreasing) function. Lemma 2 then implies that the slopes of responding strategies are bounded from above as follows:
and notice that these two upper bounds converge to 0 as r ! 0. Lemma 7 then implies thatṽ (1) c (0) and v c converge to a common limit K ( 0 ).
Corollary 2 Along any sequence of nontrivial steady-state equilibria as r ! 0, we must haveṽ (1) c (0) ! K ( 0 ) and v c ! K ( 0 ).
To prove that a non-full-trade equilibrium cannot exist when r is close to 0, it is useful to introduce yet another level of equilibria classi cation. A non-full-trade equilibrium may either have more entry than the Walrasian benchmark, i.e. v c (as shown in Figure 1 ), or less entry, i.e. v > c (as shown in Figure 4 ). Now we claim neither exists for small r. Corollary 2 implies that a non-full-trade equilibrium with more entry cannot exist when r is small. More strongly, the following lemma implies that equilibrium with more entry than Walrasian cannot exist whenever r is lower than the search costs B and S . : The proof that a non-full-trade equilibrium with less entry than the Walrasian benchmark cannot exist is based on the following idea (the details are in the Appendix.) As r ! 0, it follows from (35) that the support of dynamic types narrows down to a singleton. Consequently, a marginal participating trader whose o er is in the interior of the support of the bargaining partner gains relatively little vis-a-vis proposing at the boundary of the support (i.e. seller proposing v and buyer proposing c), but risks a substantially reduced probability of trading. We show that bidding the endpoint of the support is the best response, so for small r it must be that p B (v) = c and p S ( c) = v. This leads to the following uniqueness result.
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness of equilibrium) Given ( B ; S ) such that K ( 0 ) < 1, there is a unique equilibrium, which is full-trade, if r r where r is given by: The following corollary provides the main properties of our uniqueness bound r and relates it to the other bounds, r and min f B ; S g, in Theorem 1 and Corollary 3.
Corollary 4 (a) If B and S increase, then r increases, and vice versa. (b) We have 0 < r < min f B ; S g < r . (c) r goes to 0 as B and S go to 0.
The following example visualizes the main results of Theorem 1 and 2. In particular, whether in equilibrium every meeting results in a trade does not hinge on the level of frictions, but rather on the composition of di erent kinds of frictions (discount rate r and explicit costs B , S ). More precisely, in the friction space of (r; B ; S ), any neighborhood of 0, no matter how small, must contain a region (where r is small relative to B , S ) where only full-trade equilibria exist, and also contain another region (where r is large relative to B , S ) where only non-full-trade equilibria exist. Figure 5 . If B + S < 1 6 , a full-trade equilibrium may or may not exist, depending on whether r is su ciently small. Now let us assume B = S = , then r = 2 = max f0:5 6 ; 0g, min f B ; S g = and r 8 3 1+8 2 . The shaded area in the right panel of Figure 5 shows the values of r and for which a full-trade equilibrium exists. Under the dashed ray , non-full-trade equilibrium with more entry than Walrasian benchmark cannot exist. Under the dashed curve r, a unique equilibrium, which is full-trade, exists.
We will see in Section 4 that the condition K ( 0 ) < 1 alone is necessary and su cient for existence of a (full-trade or non-full-trade) nontrivial equilibrium.
Necessary and su cient condition for no market breakdown
The condition K ( 0 ) < 1, a necessary condition for the existence of a full-trade equilibrium, is also necessary for existence of any nontrivial equilibrium of our model. Indeed, if r = 0, any nontrivial equilibrium is full-trade. If r > 0 and some nontrivial equilibrium exists, then Lemma 7 together withṽ (1) c (0) 1 implies the condition K ( 0 ) < 1.
Perhaps surprisingly, the condition K ( 0 ) < 1 is also su cient for existence of a nontrivial equilibrium of our model.
Theorem 3 (No market breakdown)
A necessary and su cient condition for existence of a nontrivial steady-state equilibrium is that K ( 0 ) < 1.
Taken together with Corollary 1 (b), Theorem 3 implies that a non-full-trade equilibrium exists if search costs are su ciently small relative to discount rate.
Corollary 5 (Existence of a non-full-trade equilibrium) If r > 0, then there is > 0 such that a non-full-trade equilibrium exists whenever B ; S < . It might be natural to guess that a nontrivial equilibrium exists if and only if the expected search cost incurred by a buyer-seller pair (i.e. K( )) is smaller than the maximal gains from trade, which is 1. This alone does not give us a meaningful condition for existence. It is because the buyer-seller ratio is endogenous. However, because of Theorem 3, it is su cient to check only if the expected search costs when = 0 are less than 1.
The rest of this section is devoted to the main elements of the formal proof of Theorem 3. Our goal is to prove that there exists a collection f B ; S ; p B ; p S ;ṽ;c; B; S; ; g of strategies, steady-state distributions and steady-state masses of traders, that satis es our mathematical de nition of a nontrivial equilibrium. However, in order to apply a xed point theorem, it is more convenient to transform and reduce our space of equilibrium objects. De ne N B : [0; 1] ! R + and N S : [0; 1] ! R + as the steady-state unnormalized distributions of buyers and sellers, i.e. N B (v) B (v) and N S (c) S (c). Then we take (W B ; W S ; N B ; N S ) E as the primary vector of equilibrium objects.
Our mathematical de nition of a nontrivial equilibrium can be regarded as a xed point of some mapping T that brings an initial con guration E = (W B ; W S ; N B ; N S ) (from some appropriate domain) to a new con guration E = (W B ; W S ; N B ; N S ). This mapping is de ned as follows. First, we let
Then determine the dynamic types (ṽ;c) according to (2) and (3), and their distributions ~ ;~ according to (4) and (5). Next, determine the best-response proposing strategies (p B ; p S ) according to (6) and (7). Whenever there are multiple best-responses, we use the maximal response for buyers and the minimal for sellers:
Having de ned the proposing strategies, we can de ne the expected pro ts ( B ; S ) in a given meeting according to (8) and (14), as well as the probabilities of trading (q B ; q S ) according to (9) and (15). With those at hand, we can recover the resulting lifetime payo s through their corresponding recursive equations, (12) and (17):
We determine the best-response entry strategies as in (13) and (18), and nally determine the resultant steady-state distributions of types according to:
In the Appendix, some additional details and quali cations that guarantee that this mapping is well-de ned are provided.
Our existence proof will be based on the Schauder xed point theorem: if D is a nonempty compact convex subset of a Banach space and T is a continuous function from D to D, then T has a xed point. In order to make this theorem applicable, certain di culties need to be overcome. The main di culty is that as we apply the mapping T , we need to preserve positive entry. To deal with this di culty, we rst prove existence of what we call an "-equilibrium, which is an actual equilibrium of an "-model.
The "-model di ers from our original model in three ways. First, we add a subsidy that ensures that all buyers with type v 1 " and all sellers with type c " enter. Every newborn trader is quali ed to receive a ow of subsidy for her market participation, provided that (i) her type satis es v 1 " or c ", and (ii) she would choose not to participate if no subsidy were available. Further, the ow rate of the subsidy for a quali ed trader is the least amount su cient to make this trader participate. For example, a new-born buyer with type v 1 " and`B( ) B (v) < B ( ) will, conditional on entry, receive a ow amount B ( ) `B( ) B (v) per unit of time so that she is indi erent between entering or not. (We assume traders enter whenever indi erent.) The entry conditions (13) and (18) now become:
Because any subsidized traders are simply indi erent between entering or staying out, our equations for payo s W B , W S , and bargaining strategiesṽ,c, p B , p S do not need to be changed.
Although we now have a positive lower bound for the in ows of traders, we may not have a positive lower bound for the mass of traders in the market because the out ow rate (i.e.`B( )q B (v) or`S( )q S (c)) could be potentially very large. To overcome this di culty, we impose the second modi cation, which ensures that the arrival rates`B( ) and`S( ) are bounded from above by some `B and `S. We replace the matching function M (B; S) with a new oneM (B; S) = min M (B; S); B `B; S `S :
Notice thatM inherits all the properties of a matching function. But now we make sure that`B ( ) `B;`S( ) `S:
While the rst two modi cations are made to make the mass of traders bounded from below, we also want it to be bounded from above, because our domain D need to be compact. It su ces to have a lower bound for the out ow rate (`B( )q B (v) or`S( )q S (c)). For a type who chooses to enter without subsidy, there is naturally an upper bound for its mass because her expected trading surplus must be larger than her search cost. More precisely, for an unsubsidized participating v-buyer,`
However, a subsidized buyer could have`B( )q B (v) < B . Our third modi cation is to disqualify subsidized traders in a way that ensures the out ow rates of subsidized types are at least B or S . The disquali cation process is a Poisson process, with the rate equal to the minimum that makes the out ow rate greater than B or S . For example, a currently quali ed v-buyer with`B( )q B (v) < B will be disquali ed and exit immediately at a Poisson rate B `B( )q B (v); while a currently quali ed v-buyer with`B( )q B (v) B will not be disquali ed. Notice that for any type, either subsidized or unsubsidized, a v-buyer's gross out ow rate must be max f`B( )q B (v); B g. Therefore, the steady-state equations (42) now become
It completes the descriptions of our "-model. In the Appendix, we show that the "-model has at least one equilibrium, which we shall call an "-equilibrium. Next, we prove that if " > 0 is su ciently small, then an "-equilibrium is a true equilibrium of our model (this is Proposition 2 in the Appendix). The main idea of the proof is illustrated graphically in Figure 6 .
First, as in Lemma 7, we show that in an "-equilibrium also, we must have v c K ( 0 ) :
Second, we show that the trading ows are almost balanced: the discrepancy is bounded in absolute value by (a multiple of) ". Imposing these constraints on the set of values ( c; v), we obtain the set of feasible values given by the shaded area in the graph. As " ! 0, the shaded area collapses to the curvilinear segment AB. Consequently, as " gets arbitrarily small, the minimal c in the shaded area is arbitrarily close to the horizontal coordinate of Figure 6 : c > " and v < 1 " for small " point A, and the maximal feasible v is arbitrarily close to the vertical coordinate of A. It follows that for small enough " > 0, the constraints c > " and v < 1 " become non-binding and the "-equilibrium becomes a true equilibrium of our model.
The if and only if condition for existence of a non-trivial equilibrium turns out to be the same in the full information model. Mortensen and Wright (2002;  MW) consider a model that di ers from ours only in one respect: MW assume full information bargaining, i.e. bargainers know each other's type. Consequently, proposers hold their partners to their reservation values (i.e., to their dynamic types), and the proposing strategies depend on both the trader's and his partner's type. In other words, for the buyers, the proposing strategy is p B (v; c) =c (c), ifc (c) ṽ (v), while it can be de ned as any price less thañ v (v) ifc (c) >ṽ (v) (such a price will be rejected by the seller). Similarly, p S (v; c) =ṽ (v) ifc (c) ṽ (v).
MW suggest (but do not prove) that a non-full-trade equilibrium may exist. We note that our general existence proof (Theorem 3) adapts with minor changes 14 The proof is even easier because we do not have to consider proposing strategies in our construction of the best-response mapping T . It is only needed to change the de nitions of expected pro ts and trading probabilities according to
The details of the proof are available on request. Also notice that the value 0
(1 ) S B in the context of MW should not be interpreted as the buyer-seller ratio in full-trade equilibrium. Nevertheless, it can be, like in our model, interpreted as the equilibrium buyer-seller ratio when r = 0.
The entry e ect of private information
In the MW model, not every meeting may result in a trade because it may be thatṽ (v) < c (c). Indeed, under full information, an equilibrium is full-trade if and only if v c. But MW show existence of a unique equilibrium, which is full-trade, if K( 0 ) < 1 and r is su ciently small (i.e., our Theorem 1 also holds assuming full information). They also show that a full-trade equilibrium exists if and only if the discount rate is below an upper bound.
In this section we assume that r is su ciently small, so that both models have a unique equilibrium, which is full-trade. We use subscript "p" to denote private information (e.g. p (r)) and subscript "f " to denote full information (e.g. f (r)).
It is clear from (29) (31) that, in private information full-trade equilibria, the buyerseller ratio p and the marginal participating types v p and c p do not change with r: p (r) = 0 , v p (r) = v 0 and c p (r) = c 0 for all r 2 [0; r).
In full information full-trade equilibria, MW show that f , v f and c f are implicitly determined by marginal type equations and the ow balance equation:
Clearly, f (0) = 0 , v f (0) = v 0 and c f (0) = c 0 . When r = 0, the buyer-seller ratio and the marginal participating types in both models are equal. Indeed, information structure plays no role when r = 0 because heterogeneity of traders' dynamic types vanishes.
In a private-information full-trade equilibrium, v p (r) and c p (r) are constant in r. But in a full-information full-trade equilibrium, the marginal types move towards each other as r increases away from 0,
B , which can be positive or negative.
Lemma 9 implies that, when discount rate r is positive but su ciently small, the full information model has more entry. To understand why this is so, rst notice that the marginal entrants get zero rent from bargaining in responding states. But unlike in our model, the marginal entrants extract full rents from the partners to whom they propose. In contrast, our marginal entrants are only able to extract the rents of the most ine cient partner type when they propose. If r is 0, it makes no di erence because the distributions of dynamic types collapse to single points. As r increases away from 0, the distributions of the dynamic types become, ceteris paribus, more heterogeneous, and consequently there are more rents to be extracted by the marginal entrants. Of course, the marginal entrants have to be indi erent between entering or not. Hence less e cient types of traders would enter.
In the presence of matching externalities, more entry may or may not be socially desirable. Under private information, the slope of the welfare W 0 p (r) evaluated at r = 0 is W 0
This is simply the direct e ect of discounting. In particular, the e ect of discounting on buyers' (resp. sellers') welfare is proportional to their expected searching time 1=`B (resp. 1=`S). But under full information, the slope of the welfare W 0 f (r) evaluated at r = 0, as shown within the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix, is
In addition to the direct e ect, the entry of traders could increase or decrease the buyerseller ratio f , which in turn a ects the expected searching times 1=`B and 1=`S. The last term in (53)is the indirect e ect on the total accumulated search costs incurred by a cohort of buyers and sellers.
In the Appendix, we also show that the di erence of the two slopes can be written as
where S ( ) 1 m 0 ( ) =m ( ) is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the mass of sellers (i.e. S ( ) = SM 2 (B; S) =M (B; S)).
Proposition 1 For all su ciently small r > 0, the private information welfare W p (r) is higher (resp. lower) than the full information welfare
is positive (resp. negative).
It is easy to see that the di erence W 0 p (0) W 0 f (0) may be either positive or negative, depending on the elasticity of the matching function. For example, if b = s, the new-born distributions F and G are both uniform [0; 1], implying W S0 = W B0 , and the matching function is Cobb-Douglas p BS (implying S = 1=2), then the sign of W 0 p (0) W 0 f (0) is the same as 1 2 ( B S ). In other words, when discount rate is positive but small, the private information welfare is higher (resp. lower) than the full information welfare if the side with greater bargaining power incurs higher (resp. lower) search costs.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is very simple. The rst factor S ( 0 ) summarizes entry externalities, while the second factor sW S0 S bW B0 B represents how information structure a ects the equilibrium buyer-seller ratio. The product of the two represents the interaction between entry externalities and the information structure.
To get more insight, recall that traders' entry imposes a positive externality on the opposite side of the market and a negative externality on the same side. When r = 0, MW show that the positive and negative externalities completely cancel out only when the Hosios (1990) condition holds, i.e. S = . If, for example, the elasticity of matching function with respect to the mass of sellers, S , is larger than sellers' bargaining weight , then the equilibrium buyer-seller ratio is higher than the constrained optimal level, hence decreasing would be welfare enhancing. On the other hand, Lemma 9 implies that for small positive r, if sW S0 S > bW B0 B , then the private information model has a smaller . Therefore, private information can enhance welfare performance if S > and sW S0 S > bW B0 B .
Concluding remarks
The main technical contribution of this paper is the derivation of a simple bound such that a nontrivial equilibrium exists if and only if a measure of search costs is below this bound. This condition highlights the role of various factors in making a search market viable. For example, we nd that market viability does not depend on the interest rate, but does depend on the distribution of bargaining power. Our model also predicts that when r is small, every match results in a trade, i.e., there is no break-down of bargaining. This may be at odds with our (casual) perception about many search markets: Don't many negotiations in the housing or in the labor market actually break down? Asymmetric information about the true preferences seems to be an important reason for that.
Our analysis shows that in a dynamic setting, private information alone may not be sufcient to explain why many negotiations break down. Even more, under certain conditions private information may even be welfare-enhancing.
Other features of the model, like the bargaining protocol play an important role. For example, a limitation of our analysis is that we only consider a simple, one-round randomproposer take-it-or-leave-it o er (TIOLI) protocol. This allows us to characterize a fulltrade equilibrium in a simple manner. 15 Many interesting strategic issues that arise in multi-round bargaining (e.g., signalling) do not arise here. But because with r = 0 "types do not matter", one might conjecture that there is a unique full trade equilibrium for small r regardless of the bargaining protocol. This conjecture turns out to be false. For the k-double auction, Shneyerov and Wong (2008) have shown existence of non-full-trade equilibria even when r is arbitrary small relative to B , S . 16 An interesting topic for future research is to characterize a set of protocols for which non-full-trade equilibria exist for all r > 0, so that full trade is not the only outcome even when r is small. To accomplish this, it might prove useful to combine our approach with that of Lauermann (2006a) and Shneyerov and Wong (2008) , who develop techniques for studying general dynamic matching and bargaining markets.
Our model also abstracts from other features of real-world dynamic markets. For example, our analysis is con ned to steady states, and this assumption is essential to get our full-trade results. It would be interesting to explore the role of this assumption further, although this is likely to be a di cult task. Moreover, the above inequalities are strict if and only if r > 0. Q.E.D.
Before proving Lemma 3, we prove Lemma 4 rst. Notice that our proof of Lemma 4 does not rely on the monotonicity of proposing strategies, which is asserted in Lemma 3. For notational simplicity, we de ne:
Proof of Lemma 4:
Step 1: p S v and p B c. Suppose p S < v. Then there is some active seller with type c proposing p S (c) < v. Then her o er will be accepted with probability one and she can raise her o er without a ecting this probability. We get the desired contradiction and have p S v. Similar logic for a buyer would show p B c.
Step 2:
We now prove the rst part. The buyers with type v cannot get positive bargaining surplus when they respond since, from step 1, v is not higher than the lowest price p S proposed by any seller. Then in equilibrium those v-buyers must get positive surplus in proposing states, i.e.~ (p B (v))[ṽ(v) p B (v)] > 0, otherwise they cannot recover the search costs. Now for any v > v, we have~ (p
Similar logic considering sellers proves the second part.
Step 3 v. This completes the proof of the rst part of this step. The second part is shown by symmetric logic.
Step 4: Now we have already proved v p S p S v and c p B p B c. If r = 0, then by lemma 2, we have v = v and c = c, and hence it proves our claims for r = 0 case. If r > 0, then again by lemma 2, thenṽ( ) andc( ) are strictly increasing. Then
Proof of Lemma 3: If r = 0, then from Lemma 4, p B (v) and p S (c) are constant on A B and A S respectively. The rest of this proof consider the case r > 0.
Consider a buyer's proposing problem. Suppose v 2 > v 1 v. Recall (6) and by a standard argument, we have h~
From Lemma 2, if r > 0, thenṽ(v) is strictly increasing, thus~ (p B (v)) is nondecreasing in v. Now suppose v 1 < v 2 but p B (v 1 ) > p B (v 2 ). Since~ (p B ( )) is nondecreasing, we have~ (p B (v 1 )) ~ (p B (v 2 )). On the other hand,~ ( ) is nondecreasing, we havẽ (p B (v 1 )) ~ (p B (v 2 )). Therefore~ (p B (v 1 )) =~ (p B (v 2 )) > 0, where the last inequality is from step 2 in the proof of Lemma 4. However, then type v 1 buyers could propose a lower price, namely p B (v 2 ), without a ecting the probability of being accepted, which is positive. We get a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: Notice that by Lemma 4, v p S (0) and therefore the v buyer will make positive pro t only when he is the proposer. His o er p B (v) will be accepted only if the seller's dynamic typec(c) p B (v). The entry condition (13) then implies (25). Similar logic leads to (26). Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1: It su ces to prove that in the candidate full-trade equilibrium characterized by ( 0 ; v 0 ; c 0 ), type c 0 sellers have no incentive to propose above v 0 and type v 0 buyers have no incentive to propose below c 0 . This is trivial when r = 0, so suppose r > 0. We will work with the full-trade equilibrium candidate in the rest of this proof, but for notational simplicity, we omit the subscript "0". For concreteness, we focus on the sellers (a symmetric argument applies for the buyers). The expected pro t contingent on proposing p v is S ( c; p) = (p c) 1 ~ (p) ; and its slope is
is the \virtual type" that corresponds to the distribution of dynamic types~ ,
Notice that~ (p) = ṽ 1 (p) and in a full-trade equilibrium, we have 1
. Besides, in full-trade equilibrium q B (v) = 1 for all v v, so that Lemma 2 implies v (v) = rv +`Bv r +`B :
Substituting the above formulas for~ , andṽ into the formula forJ B , and simplifying, we obtainJ
is the virtual type function for the distribution F . Substituting (56) in the slope formula (55), we obtain
Clearly, a deviation to p < v is not pro table, so we only need to consider p > v. A necessary condition for such a deviation to be not pro table is that the slope @ S ( c; p) =@p is non-positive at p = v. This is also su cient because, due to the monotonicity of J B , this slope being non-positive at p = v implies it is also non-positive at any p > v. That is, we only need to verify that the expression in the brackets on the right-hand side of (57) is non-negative when p = v. This is reduced to the inequality
Similarly, a necessary and su cient condition to rule out a pro table deviation by a buyer with type v is v `S c + rJ S ( c) r +`S 0:
Equivalently, we can eliminate r from both inequalities to combine them as:
Finally, applying the full-trade equilibrium marginal type equations (27) and (28) 
Sum these two inequalities up and rearrange terms. Then we get the desired inequality. Q.E.D. Proof of Theorem 2: Corollary 3 asserts that v > c for all r < minf B ; S g. From now on in this proof we only consider those small r. Consider any nontrivial equilibrium. Since proposing strategies are nondecreasing, it is su cient to prove that the optimal proposing strategies for marginal participating buyers and sellers are c and v respectively. It is obviously true when r = 0, so we assume r > 0 for the rest of the proof.
Consider a type c seller's proposing state. His expected bargaining surplus conditional on proposing p 2 [v;ṽ (1)] is:
The cdf~ (p) is absolutely continuous, therefore S ( c; p) is di erentiable in p almost everywhere. Whenever di erentiable,
where~ is the density of buyers' dynamic types. This density is equal tõ
where is the density of buyers' types in the market.
We want to show that the slope in (58) must be negative for all su ciently small r > 0. Firstly, from r < , Lemma 8 and (33) in Lemma 7, we obtain
Moreover, from (35) in text, for all v v,ṽ 0 (v) r= (r + ), so we havẽ
We now derive a lower bound on the endogenous density of buyers' types . From the steady-state condition, we can deduce
and
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the v-type buyer must recover his search cost,`Bq B (v) B . A symmetric argument for the sellers shows that 
Then apply (59), (60) and (62) to (58), and simplify, we obtain @ S ( c; p) @p 1 K ( 0 ) r 1 :
Similarly, we can consider a type v buyer's proposing state and nd that for almost all p 2 [c (0) ; c], we have (1 )
Working with the sellers' marginal type equation (50) in the same fashion, we have
Equations (63) and (64) can be solved for c 0 f (0) v 0 f (0) and 0 f (0). After some rewriting, from the characterizing equations of ( 0 ; v 0 ; c 0 ), we get 0 
(Notice that 0 N B (1) b= B and 0 N S (1) s= S are implied.)
Lemma 10 D " is nonempty, convex and compact for any (r; `B; `S) (0; B ; S ) and any " 2 (0; "].
Proof: Obviously, D " is nonempty (this is where we need " "), convex and closed. Furthermore, D " is a uniformly bounded family of functions. D " is also an equicontinuous family of functions because the Lipschitz constant for every function in D " is at most max
By Ascoli-Arzela Theorem (see e.g. Royden (1988) Several remarks are needed to claim that our de nition 3 of T " is legitimate, i.e. T " is well-de ned and its range, as stated in the de nition, is contained in its domain D " . The restrictions we impose on the domain D " are important to claim that. Firstly, since N B (1) > 0 and N S (1) > 0, the distribution variables (B; S; ; ; ) are clearly well-de ned by (37). Second, the normalized distributions ( ; ) inherit continuity from the unnormalized distributions (N B ; N S ); and the dynamic typesṽ andc (de ned in (2) and (3)) inherit continuity from W B and W S .
Third, since r > 0 and hence 0 W 0 B < 1 and 0 W 0 S < 1, the dynamic types v andc are strictly increasing. Therefore they have well-de ned, strictly increasing and continuous inversesṽ 1 on [ṽ (0) ;ṽ (1)] andc 1 on [c (0) ;c (1)]. We can de neṽ 1 (x) 1 when x >ṽ (1) andc 1 (x) 0 when x <c (0). Thenṽ 1 andc 1 are continuous on [0; 1], as are~ = ṽ 1 and~ = c 1 . Fourth, since~ andṽ are continuous, the arg max correspondence in the de nition (38) of p B is nonempty-valued and compact-valued. Thus p B is well-de ned; and p B , as the supremum of the arg max correspondence, is itself a maximizer. The same logic applies to the sellers' counterpart p S . 18
Fifth, W B can be rewritten, by the de nition ofṽ(v), p B , q B and B , as:
where the supremum is taken overv 2 [0; 1] and 2 f0; 1g. (The de nition of^ B (v;v) is in the proof of Lemma 1.) Since^ B ( ;v) and W B are absolutely continuous and nondecreasing,
wherever W B is di erentiable. Therefore W B satis es all the restrictions on it imposed by the de nition of D " . The symmetric logic applies to the sellers' counterpart W S . Sixth, by the de nition of N B and B , we have
and wherever di erentiable,
Clearly we also have N B (0) = 0, thus N B satis es all the restrictions on it imposed by the de nition of D " . The same logic applies to the sellers' counterpart N S . We conclude that our de nition 3 of T " is legitimate.
We will next prove the continuity of the mapping T " . In order to do that, we introduce the following lemma, which is a generalized version of Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem.
Lemma 11 (Generalized Lebesgue Theorem) Suppose (i) a sequence of c.d.f.'s f n g on [0; 1] is pointwise convergent to , (ii) a sequence of functions f n g on [0; 1] is almostpointwise convergent to , and (iii) there is some constant C such that j n j C for all n. Then lim
that~ (pB (v)) > 0 or~ (pB (v)) > 0). To see this, notice that the objective function of the maximization problem in the de nition (38) of pB satis es increasing di erences in (v; p). Thus any selectionpB of the arg max correspondence on the serious bid region is nondecreasing. IfpB (v) < pB (v) for some v in the interior of the serious bid region, then v must be a jump point of pB ( ). But from monotonicity, pB ( ) can have at most countably many jump points on the serious bid region. And nally, a countable set is of Lebesgue measure 0. Now we can see our claim is true. The same logic applies to the sellers' counterpart pS.
Proof: This is a special case of the theorem provided in Royden (1988) p.270, except that we have weakened the pointwise convergence of f n g to be almost-pointwise convergence. This weakening is clearly valid because an integral over a set of measure zero is zero. Q.E.D.
Lemma 12 The mapping T " : D " ! D " is continuous for any (r; `B; `S) (0; B ; S ) and any " 2 (0; "].
Proof: Fix any sequence fE n g 1 n=1 in D " which is uniformly convergent to E. Let us maintain our notations used in the construction of T " to denote the various elements associated with the limit E, and add a subscript n to denote the various elements associated with E n . Then it su ces to prove that the sequence fE n g 1 n=1 fT " (E n )g 1 n=1 is uniformly convergent to E T " (E). Now we claim that proving uniform convergence for several functions can be reduced to proving the corresponding pointwise convergence. Indeed, for each of the function sequences f n g, f n g, fṽ n g, fc n g, n~ n o , n~ n o , fW Bn g, fW Sn g, fN Bn g and fN Sn g, pointwise convergence is equivalent to uniform convergence. It is because each of those function sequences form an equicontinuous family of functions with a compact domain [0; 1] (see e.g. Royden (1988) p.168) . To see that f n g is equicontinuous, simply notice that, by our construction in the de nition 3 of T " , each n is Lipschitz continuous and its derivative has bounds independent of n:
The logic for the sequences fṽ n g, n~ n o , fW Bn g and fN Bn g are the same except that the bounds of derivatives di er:
1 R B ṽ 0 (v) 1;
The symmetric logic applies to f n g, fc n g, n~ n o , fW Sn g and fN Sn g.
In the rest of this proof, we show that (with fE n g 1 n=1 uniformly convergent to E) fE n g 1 n=1 is pointwise convergent to E , keeping in mind the fact that once we show the pointwise convergence for one of the functions mentioned in the last paragraph, uniform convergence for that function automatically follows. Now by inspection of our constructions in de nition 3, the uniform convergence of fE n g implies that fB n g, fS n g, f n g, f n g, f n g, fṽ n g and fc n g are all convergent to their limits B, S, , , ,ṽ andc.
Recall thatṽ n is Lipschitz continuous, and its derivativeṽ 0 n is uniformly bounded away from zero (namely 1 ṽ 0 n 1 R B > 0). Asṽ n uniformly converges toṽ, these properties maintain in the limit. As a result, for any x 2 [0; 1], we have I[ṽ n (v) x] ! I[ṽ(v) x] for almost every v 2 [0; 1]. (The only possible exception is at v =ṽ 1 (x).) Applying Lemma 11 and recalling (4), we have~ n !~ . The same logic shows that~ n !~ . We next claim that p Bn (v) ! p B (v) for almost all v 2 [0; 1]. In fact, p Bn (v) might not be convergent to p B (v). However, we claim that the set of those v for which nonconvergence exists has zero Lebesgue measure. First notice that the objective functioñ n (p)[ṽ n (v) p] in the de nition of p Bn (v) uniformly converges as n ! 1, and is continuous in p, and the constraint set [0; 1] is compact, then by the Maximum Theorem, the arg max correspondence must be upper-hemicontinuous with respect to n. That is to say, any subsequential limit of p Bn (v) (which exists because p Bn (v) 2 [0; 1]) must be maximizing the limiting objective function~ (p) 
is not a singleton. One possibility for the above arg max being not a singleton is thatṽ(v) < supfc :~ (c) = 0g. It does not create a problem for the convergence of fp Bn (v)g because in that case p Bn (v) ! supfc :~ (c) = 0g = p B (v). Now suppose thatṽ(v) supfc :~ (c) = 0g. Then by a standard argument of increasing di erences, we see that any selection of the above arg max correspondence must be nondecreasing in c. That is to say, if there is a c such thatṽ(v) supfc :~ (c) = 0g and p Bn (v) is not convergent to p B (v), then this v must be a discontinuous point of p B ( ). Besides, since p B is nondecreasing on an interval domain, it has at most countably many discontinuous points. As a result, the set of those v for which p Bn (v) is not convergent to p B (v) is of measure zero with respect to Lebesgue measure. It follows that p Bn (v) ! p B (v) almost everywhere with respect to the measures generated by the c.d.f.'s F , and f n g 1 n=1 , since F , and f n g 1 n=1 are absolutely continuous (see e.g. Royden (1988) p.303, Problem 17). The same logic shows that p Sn (c) ! p S (c) almost everywhere with respect to Lebesgue measure, and hence the measures generated by the c.d.f.'s G, and f n g 1 n=1 . Now we are ready to show W Bn ! W Bn . Rewrite W Bn as: :
Since we have n ! , n ! ,ṽ n !ṽ,c n !c, W Bn ! W B , and p Sn (c) ! p Sn (c) for almost all c, we can see that W Bn ! W Bn by applying Lemma 11. The same logic shows that W Sn ! W S . In order to prove N Bn ! N B , we need to prove that q Bn , Bn and Bn converge almost everywhere. By de nition, 
We thus conclude that Bn (v) ! B (v) for almost all v.
Recalling the de nition of N Bn (v), we see that the convergence of q Bn and Bn almost everywhere implies N Bn (v) ! N B (v) for all v, again by applying Lemma 11. As we have claimed, it implies N Bn ! N B uniformly. The same logic shows N Sn ! N S as well. In conclusion, the sequence fE n g 1 n=1 is uniformly convergent to E . Q.E.D.
Lemma 13 Fix any (r; `B; `S) (0; B ; S ) and any " 2 (0; "]. There exists a xed point E 2 D " such that T " (E) = E. That is, our "-model described in Section 4 has at least one equilibrium ("-equilibrium).
Proof: As claimed before, D " is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Banach space (C[0; 1]) 4 and the mapping T " is continuous. Then we obtain our result by applying the Schauder Fixed Point Theorem (which is stated in Section 4). Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 Fix r > 0. Suppose K( 0 ) < 1. Then for all su ciently small " > 0, any "-equilibrium is in fact an equilibrium of our original model.
Proof:
Consider an "-equilibrium. De ne v as the lowest buyers' type of (either subsidized or unsubsidized) entrants and c as the highest sellers' type of (either subsidized or unsubsidized) entrants, i.e. Notice that in order to claim that an "-equilibrium is a true equilibrium in our original model, it su ces to claim that, in the "-equilibrium, c > ", v < 1 " (i.e. no entrant is subsidized) and`B( ) < `B,`S( ) < `S (i.e. our modi cation on the matching function does not have a bite). First of all, as in Lemma 7, we want to claim that v c K( 0 ):
Since the assertion is trivial if v c, suppose that v > c. In the "-equilibrium, the payo function W B is continuous in v, thus marginal participating buyers must have zero payo , i.e. W B (v) = 0. Therefore those marginal buyers cannot have expected pro t greater than their search costs. Moreover, a marginal buyer can have a positive pro t only when she proposes, because no seller would propose less than v, for the same reason as in the original model. It follows that Second, we want to claim that, in the "-equilibrium, the in ows of traders are approximately (although not exactly) balanced, i.e. b[1 F (v)] sG( c), when " is small. By the de nition of and N B (given in (37) and (47)) and that N B = N B , we have the in ow-out ow form of buyers' steady-state equation: If no buyer is subsidized, the out ow (i.e. the right-hand side) is simply the trading out ow B`B( ) R 1 v q B (v)d (v). Now consider the case in which some buyers are subsidized (which implies v = 1 "). Let v 0 > v be the lowest type who participates without subsidization. Then the out ow is
The rst term of the last expression is the trading out ow and the second term is the disquali cation out ow. The disquali cation out ow is O("): 
If we let " ! 0, then we have b[1 F (v)] sG( c) ! 0 from (69), while v c is bounded away from 1 according to K( 0 ) < 1 and (68). In the limit, we must have the strict inequalities c > 0 and v < 1. It follows that for all small enough " > 0, we have c > " and v < 1 ". The shaded area in Figure 6 illustrates the feasible region of ( c; v) for a small ". In such an "-equilibrium with small ", no trader is subsidized. Hence the marginal entrants must be able to recover their search costs. In particular, the entry equations (25) and (26) hold and they imply that is bounded away from 0 and 1. Thus as long as `B and `S are chosen to be large enough, our modi cation of the matching function does not have a bite. It follows that we obtain a true equilibrium of our original model. Q.E.D.
